Transfer deadline day as it happened
Opposition shooting statistic. This figure compares the shooting statistics of all the teams facing Manchester City across the two seasons. This suggests that the increased number of goals conceded could be down to one of two things: 1. Or was it individual errors that lead to these opportunities? In defence of Joe Hart his role as a goalkeeper means that any mistake is more than likely to end up in a goal scoring or goal scored situation. Does luck play a part? For example if you are playing Manchester United and the error leads to a goal scoring opportunity you would be lucky if it fell to say Evra or Jones and relatively unlucky for it to fall to RVP.
It could also be argued that due to RVP playing as a striker the errors are more than likely to fall to him but that is a discussion for another day. This can, conversely, be applied to the clear cut chance conversion rate of the opposition as well with it depending regularly who the opponent is and who the chance fell to.
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Regular watchers of Manchester City may point towards a perceived change of style and philosophy, perpetrated by the arrival of Txiki Begiristain. With an increased focus on the pressurizing the ball player it would have been expected for this number to increase. This was combined with a rise in the spreading of the ball from side to side with a 9. However, an increase in the total number of OPP played and an increased OPP pass completion would have been expected with an adoption of this approach, but in fact both of these decreased slightly.
The result in this change of philosophy appears to be two fold.
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However, this only equated to an increase of 2 more clear-cut chances over the course of the season. Finally, an examination of the teams goal scoring efficiency throws up some disturbing reading for the MCFC players and fans alike. This resulted in city taking 15 fewer clear cut chances than the previous season. The reasons for this, though, are quite unclear. Could it be down to luck as muted before? Or playing personal issues. Could this decrease be due to Sergio Aguero missing minutes of premiership action after a series of injuries?
It is clear that Manchester City struggled to emulate the previous years performance in a limp title defence. Blame can be pointed towards both players and manager, with neither living up to their own expectations. EU competition law requires that the market be defined first in terms of geography and then in terms of product.
BBC - Phil McNulty: Man City's Blue Moon rises
C 5, 6. The geographical market is comprised of all the areas in which the undertakings are involved in the supply and demand of the products and where the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous. Here, the geographic market is comprised of all fifty-four nations that compete in the UEFA. This is basically all of Europe, including countries that do not belong to the EU. C 5, 6; see also supra text accompanying note Next, the product market must be determined.
Where did it go wrong for Manchester City in 2013? Stats Comparison 11/12 & 12/13
The main characteristic to determine a product market is to determine if there is any substitute for that product. The UEFA is organized as an association of football associations that overlooks football competitions and clubs, specifically European-wide competitions.
The product market is therefore professional club European football competitions. See Flood v. Kuhn, U. For example, when analyzing baseball antitrust cases, the market was held to be professional baseball. See id. There are no substitutes for this. While people can watch other professional sports, it is a different type of entertainment than football, as people only prefer to watch certain sports.
The national team competitions have a different market and, therefore, are considered a different product. While, national competitions have the audience of their country and traditionally their supporters are composed of their citizens.
No other European-wide club competitions exist. Therefore, no other product, including national team competitions, can compare to watching the club competitions. If products are used for different purposes, the products belong to separate markets. For example, in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, the Court of Justice held that limited substitution seemed insufficient to establish interchangeability.
Club and national competitions have limited substitution, as people tend to support their country in the national competition, and have a club team they cheer for as well, it may be the same sport, but club and national team competitions have different audiences. See Ezrachi , supra note , at 3. Article 1 violations are comprised of three elements. First, there must be proof that there is some form of collusion between undertakings.
Second, the collusion must affect trade between member states. Each of these elements will be taken in turn to show that FFP violates Article 1 and, therefore, considered illegal by violating EU competition law. Article 1 does not distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements.
Vertical agreements are agreements between different levels of the production chain. Horizontal agreements are agreements between different entities at the same level of the production chain. Article 1 requires that there be an agreement between undertakings or a decision by an association of undertakings.
C 47, If the view is taken that the UEFA is an association of undertakings, or an association of associations of undertakings, then Article 1 is violated. The articles of an association, such as the UEFA, rarely amount to anticompetitive activity that offends Article 1. It is more frequent that agreements among the members in an association violates Article 1.
Often, the attempt to impose discipline or order into the market violates Article 1. FFP is an express written agreement approved on by many of the necessary organizations, with a sanction-loss of a license if not complied with. Financial fair play: all you need to know , Union of Eur. While the UEFA is considered an undertaking itself, it is also made up of other undertakings the football associations that approve FFP. Also, as discussed above, clubs themselves are becoming more and more involved in the UEFA and take part in discussions and agreements on initiatives including FFP.
Therefore, FFP is easily considered collusion between undertakings, as the different football associations and clubs approve of the agreement, the FFP regulations. For FFP to violate Article 1 , this agreement must affect the freedom of trade among member states. First, to prove that FFP is affecting trade, the markets must be examined to see how the agreement affected the markets. The analysis has two factors.
Maschinenbau Ulm, E. An agreement need not currently affect the pattern of trade, but merely have the potential to do so.
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This is not a difficult requirement. If the parties—the many national football associations and clubs—to the agreement are in more than one member state there is little chance that the agreement does not affect trade among the member states of the European Union. As the UEFA is a European-wide organization, and the members of the football associations and clubs regularly do business amongst themselves through the buying and selling of players, or through playing each other, it is clear that FFP will have an influence on the pattern of trade between member states.
Due to the amount of economic activity among the clubs scattered throughout Europe, there is little to no chance that FFP would not meet this requirement. C 1. Thus, even if an agreement does not manage to affect competition, but the object of the agreement was to do so, then Article 1 declares the agreement illegal. Similarly, an agreement that is completely innocent when made, but has the effect of restricting competition, is illegal.
This is the essential core of Article 1. Article 1 holds illegal any agreement that prevents, restricts or distorts competition within the EU through object or effect and, therefore, FFP will be analyzed first to see if it distorts competition by the object. When determining whether an agreement prevents, restricts, or distorts competition by object, there is no requirement to look at the concrete effects of the agreement. According to the Court of Justice in Consten and Grundig v Commission , if the agreement has the potential to restrict competition, then that is sufficient.
Agreements that affect competition by object are agreements that, by their very nature, have the potential to restrict competition. C 97, If, by merely looking at the agreement, an anticompetitive objective is shown, that agreement affects competition by object.
This could be seen as very similar to a quick look approach in American antitrust law. There are several types of agreements that the Court of Justice has held to be restricting competition by object, including certain agreements that have hard core effects, such as price-fixing, export bans, and absolute territorial protection. There are a number of factors that the Commission suggests to analyze if an agreement affects competition by object. These factors consist of: 1 the content of the agreement and the objective aims pursued by it; 2 the context in which it is to be applied and the actual conduct and behavior of the parties on the market; and 3 an examination of the facts underlying the agreement and the specific circumstances in which it operates may be required.
It seems clear that UEFA has a blatant anti-competitive objective in attempting to affect the salary, and transfer fee market.